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LAWYERING IN  
THE CHRISTIAN COLONY:  
SOME HAUERWASIAN THEMES, 
REFLECTIONS, AND QUESTIONS 
W. BRADLEY WENDEL* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The basic question for secular philosophical legal ethics, following the 
formulation in an influential paper by Charles Fried, is often taken to be, “Can 
a good lawyer be a good person?”1 This question highlights the possibility that 
obligations owed as a matter of one’s professional role might conflict with 
duties owed qua moral agent. As classic case studies illustrate, lawyers may be 
required to keep information confidential that could be used to prevent serious 
harm if disclosed,2 assert a technical defense to defeat a just claim,3 or provide 
legal representation to loathsome clients like the Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux 
Klan or a former guard at the Treblinka concentration camp.4 The so-called 
standard conception of legal ethics tells lawyers that they must act out of 
exclusive concern for the legal interests of their clients. A lawyer is permitted to 
disregard the interests of affected third parties and the public interest, if it 
would be in the client’s interests to do so, and if the law permits the violation in 
question of the third party or public interest. Why must a lawyer, for example, 
interpose a procedural defense to enable her client to avoid paying a debt she 
admits she owes? Because it is in the client’s interests, the maneuver is “within 
the bounds of the law” in the sense that neither the client nor the lawyer would 
be subject to legal penalties for employing it, and because the lawyer’s only 
moral obligation arises from the duty of loyalty to her client who has the 
autonomy to choose whether or not to repay the debt. Critics of the standard 
conception claim that when lawyers violate the rights of non-clients by 
deceiving, humiliating, or manipulating them, the purported justifications they 
 
Copyright © 2012 by W. Bradley Wendel. 
This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/. 
*     Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School. 
 1.  Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer–Client Relation, 
85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 (1976). 
 2.  See, e.g., Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962). 
 3.  See, e.g., Zabella v. Pakel, 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957). 
 4.  For an analysis of numerous client-selection cases, see W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND 
FIDELITY TO LAW 122–55 (2010). 
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offer fail to excuse the moral wrongs they commit.5 Although loyalty to clients 
may be an important value, other values are also implicated in these cases, and 
defenders of the standard conception must also justify a priority principle that 
gives client-regarding obligations greater weight than obligations owed to 
affected non-clients or to society as a whole. 
For the purposes of this symposium on the relevance of the work of Stanley 
Hauerwas for the law, the important thing to notice about this debate is that 
most defenses of the standard conception are grounded, in one way or another, 
in political liberalism.6 The liberal foundation is evident in Stephen Pepper’s 
well-known warning against government by an “oligarchy of lawyers.”7 At least 
regarding competent adults, all of us are moral agents, responsible for 
determining how to lead our lives. The law necessarily imposes restrictions on 
what we may do, but no one else is empowered to place restrictions on our 
autonomy. In a complex, highly legalistic society, however, we are necessarily 
required in some cases to seek advice from legally trained professionals to 
determine whether our proposed course of conduct may violate the law, or to 
employ mechanisms provided by the legal system (such as contracts, wills and 
trusts, and business entities) to achieve our goals. In providing this assistance, 
lawyers should not impose their own views about the morality of their clients’ 
conduct. Rather, they should assist their clients in implementing their own plans 
and providing technical assistance.8 
As any reader of Hauerwas knows, this is an aspect of the modernist anomie 
he warns about. In a modern liberal society, autonomy to decide for oneself is 
exalted into the first principle of ethics, with the result that individuals are cut 
off from the resources they need (traditions, communities, stories) to construct 
meaningful lives for themselves. This kind of alienation can be cured only by 
associating oneself with a community—for Hauerwas this is the church—and 
sharing in the ongoing development of its history. Before turning to the 
theological critique of liberalism, however, it is noteworthy that some lawyers 
outside the church have also found the standard conception unsatisfying 
 
 5.  See, e.g., ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES (1999); DAVID LUBAN, 
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE (1988); DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 97–298 (2007). 
 6.  See, e.g., TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES? A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD 
CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER’S ROLE (2009); Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: 
A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 613; Fried, supra note 1; 
WENDEL, supra note 4. Bill Simon and Bob Gordon have long emphasized that the strongest critiques 
of the standard conception are essentially critiques of liberalism. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon & 
William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: 
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 230 (Robert L. Nelson ed., 1992). 
 7.  Pepper, supra note 6, at 617. 
 8.  The summary in this paragraph of the liberal argument for the standard conception is 
somewhat schematic, and defenders of the standard conception may differ from it in certain details. For 
example, Pepper believes lawyers should engage in moral dialogue with their clients. See Pepper, supra 
note 6, at 630–31. Monroe Freedman, another staunch defender of the standard conception, insists that 
lawyers are fully morally accountable for their choice of whom to represent, but not morally 
accountable for the means of representation. See MONROE FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, 
UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS § 4.02 (4th ed. 2010). 
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because its grounding in thin, procedural values cuts lawyers off from the moral 
resources that would give meaning to their professional lives. Students go to law 
school hoping to learn to do justice, observes Bill Simon, but they graduate with 
the belief that they are supposed to be merely instruments for the realization of 
their clients’ lawful ends.9 Lawyers learn that their role is not about pursuing 
justice, but about defending clients’ interests, which may not have anything to 
do with justice. Morally conscientious lawyers may therefore try to distance 
themselves from responsibility for the substantive injustice in which they are 
implicated, but in doing so they learn to identify themselves with this stance of 
detachment.10 A liberal legal ethics leads ineluctably to an impoverished self-
conception of lawyers as ethical professionals. Moreover, it leads lawyers into 
complicity with violence as they use the means of coercion supplied by the state 
to secure rights and goods sought by their clients.11 
The parallels between the philosophical criticism of the standard conception 
and Hauerwas’s theological critique of liberalism are striking. Thus, one may 
ask whether a Christian lawyer can follow some version of the standard 
conception. In this paper I want to give an affirmative answer to that question, 
but defending this position would seem to require the Herculean task of coming 
to grips with the vast corpus of Hauerwas’s scholarship. His argument against 
liberalism from a Christian point of view is extraordinarily complex and 
composed of many strands—some methodological, like his emphasis on the 
inextricability of values from a narrative situated within a community, and 
others substantive, like his commitment to non-violence. It is important to 
hazard an attempt at summarizing it, however, because this paper offers a 
constructive argument for an engaged Christian legal ethics in which the first 
obligation of lawyers is to respect the law. Given the thoroughgoing critique of 
liberalism presented by Hauerwas, a conscientious Christian lawyer might be 
suspicious of any conception of professional ethics that seemed to rely on an 
obligation of support, obedience, or fidelity to state-constituted institutions such 
as the law and the legal system. Thus, with not inconsiderable trepidation I offer 
a brief summary, in part II, of some Hauerwasian themes and arguments in 
critique of political liberalism. 
Although many of his objections are well taken, Hauerwas sometimes treats 
liberalism as a monolith, as opposed to a term defined more by family 
 
 9.  WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 1 (1998) (“No social role encourages such 
ambitious moral aspirations as the lawyer’s, and no social role so consistently disappoints the 
aspirations it encourages.”). 
 10.  Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 74–79 
(1980). 
 11.  Although Reinhold Niebuhr may have had more influence in political ethics in the United 
States, the impact of John Howard Yoder on Christian legal ethics has been remarkable. See RICHARD 
P. CHURCH, FIRST BE RECONCILED: CHALLENGING CHRISTIANS IN THE COURTS (2008); THOMAS L. 
SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981). Although Shaffer is a Baptist, he describes 
being profoundly influenced by Yoder. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, MORAL MEMORANDA FROM JOHN 
HOWARD YODER: CONVERSATIONS ON LAW, ETHICS AND THE CHURCH BETWEEN A MENNONITE 
THEOLOGIAN AND A HOOSIER LAWYER (2002).  
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resemblances than by necessary and sufficient conditions.12 Some varieties of 
liberalism may not be as vulnerable to the objections Hauerwas raises, and thus 
may not be as threatening to theological ethics.13 In order to clear some space 
for a different conception of Christian lawyering, it will first be helpful to see 
whether Hauerwas’s objections to liberalism hold against a theory of politics 
that begins with foundational assumptions other than deracinated individuals, 
and assumes that politics is something more than merely a technology to satisfy 
preexisting wants. The liberal theory offered here assumes, instead, that people 
have reasons to live together in communities and work out a common approach 
to living together, while treating one another as equals. To the extent there are 
good theological grounds for treating one another as equals, this version of 
liberalism can be understood as a political response to God’s presence in the 
world. A consistent theme in Hauerwas’s work is the dependence of values 
upon communities, traditions, and stories. There does not seem to be a reason 
why part of a community’s tradition and self-understanding cannot be pluralism 
and the corresponding need for some means of dealing with one another 
despite empirical uncertainty and disagreement about morality. If a 
community’s history and traditions can be so characterized, then any duties a 
citizen, public official, or lawyer may have toward the community’s institutions, 
including the legal system, may be understood as a way of expressing respect for 
one’s fellow citizens. 
The constructive part of the argument here requires consideration of 
another approach to theological ethics, and therefore theological legal ethics, 
which offers its own constitutive narrative about the type of community we wish 
to build together. A Christian lawyer will still be a bit strange, as Hauerwas 
insists she should be, but will not be unwilling to use the institutions and 
procedures of the legal system to help keep our society as a whole, not just the 
church, in good working order. To be a bit provocative here, I call this position 
modest Constantinianism,14 but it is grounded in the tradition of Lutheran 
political ethics, which sees political institutions as “a realm of divinely ordained 
authority and law, albeit perennially distorted by sin.”15 Of course no human 
 
 12.  Cf. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 67 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 3d ed. 1958). 
 13.  Cf. JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 127–28 (2004) (criticizing Alasdair 
MacIntyre, with whom Hauerwas shares many methodological commitments and substantive 
arguments for lumping together different conceptions of political liberalism). 
 14.  Borrowing from John Howard Yoder, Hauerwas has used the term Constantinianism to refer 
broadly to a systematic blurring of the lines between church and state. Politically the term referred to 
offices such as prince-bishops that no longer exist, but the term (and its related label “Christendom”) 
remains a way to identify, and in Hauerwas’s writing to stigmatize, the view that the church and state 
ought to work together to transform the world according to the demands of God’s righteousness. See, 
e.g., STANLEY HAUERWAS, AFTER CHRISTENDOM?: HOW THE CHURCH IS TO BEHAVE IF FREEDOM, 
JUSTICE, AND A CHRISTIAN NATION ARE BAD IDEAS (1991) [hereinafter HAUERWAS, AFTER 
CHRISTENDOM?]. 
 15.  JOHN WITTE, JR., LAW AND PROTESTANTISM: THE LEGAL TEACHINGS OF THE LUTHERAN 
REFORMATION 93 (2002); see generally CHURCH & STATE: LUTHERAN PERSPECTIVES (John R. 
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institution can fully instantiate God’s justice on earth, but that does not mean 
that citizens (and lawyers) cannot work to accomplish justice and peace, as best 
as they are able, in and through political communities. This alternative is not 
offered as a bit of confessional Lutheran theology. Not only am I manifestly 
unqualified to defend it on those grounds, but I hope that the position is 
appealing to those with different denominational allegiances, as a broadly 
Christian approach to political ethics.16 The Lutheran grounding is offered, 
however, in a Hauerwasian spirit, because Hauerwas emphasizes that one 
cannot transcend one’s history and the stories told within one’s tradition.17 This 
is part of my story, and the only way I know how to begin an exploration of 
theological ethics. 
The animating ideal of the positive argument presented here is that politics 
and political ethics are fundamentally about people trying to live together in a 
society composed of equals. Certain ways of treating each other are ruled out 
by the idea that people are, by nature, equal to one another in worth. Physical 
domination, coercion, and deception all manifest an attitude that others are less 
than equals. On the other hand, people can treat one another as equals, as 
fellow citizens of a political community, by seeking a means of regulating the 
affairs of the community that accords respect to competing viewpoints while 
also recognizing that it may be necessary for there to be rules and principles 
that stand in the name of the community as a whole. The institutions and 
practices of democratic self-government, including the ideal of the rule of law 
 
Stumme & Robert W. Tuttle eds., 2003). 
 16.  Cf. Mark A. Noll, The Lutheran Difference, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 1992, at 31 (pointing out 
resources that Lutherans have to offer to Christian thought generally). 
 17.  Hauerwas frequently talks about narratives and traditions as things that are given, not chosen. 
Consider the example of being a Texan, which for Hauerwas is an important ontological category. He 
writes of his fellow Texan, H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., that “Engelhardt did not use the language of 
‘choice’ to characterize what it means for him to be a Texan. He knows that such language is surely a 
distortion of the great and good reality that comes from finding one’s life constituted by such a land and 
people.” STANLEY HAUERWAS, Not All Peace Is Peace: Why Christians Cannot Make Peace with 
Tristram Engelhardt’s Peace, in WILDERNESS WANDERINGS: PROBING TWENTIETH-CENTURY 
THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 115 (1997). No matter how rich a tradition is, Hauerwas seems to say, if 
it is freely chosen, it is somehow not authentically part of the character and identity of the person who 
chooses it. He therefore rejects the view that autonomy is itself a value, as opposed to a precondition 
for choosing things that are themselves valuable. Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 417–
18 (1986) (arguing that autonomy has value insofar as it enables people to have an autonomous life). It 
is not clear whether this claim is part of Hauerwas’s critique of modernity or a theory of value. To me it 
seems plausible as the former, but too strong as the latter. In this passage he seems to take both 
positions: “[O]ne of the oddities of the contemporary situation is that what it means to be a person, to 
be free and/or autonomous, is to be capable of creating or ‘choosing’ our ‘identity.’” STANLEY 
HAUERWAS, A Tale of Two Stories, in CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE TODAY 25, 27 (Brazos Press 2001) 
(1988). Later in the article, however, he suggests a way of resolving this tension. Although he does not 
use this word, the crucial idea may be a person coming to endorse an aspect of his or her identity that 
initially presents itself as given. Hauerwas cites his identity as a Texan as “the context that makes 
intelligible the stories of my people.” Id. at 36. Other people raised in Texas may not see that fact as 
important to making their stories intelligible. So, too, with the identity of Christian. For some people 
this may simply be a fact, but for others it may supply the crucial context to making something 
intelligible. 
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and the procedures of legal argumentation and decisionmaking, are ultimately 
justified with reference to the ideal of the equality and dignity of all persons. 
The interesting further question is whether it is possible to give a theologically 
well-grounded account of political ideals such as citizenship and equality. If 
there is an overlap between our identity as Christians and as citizens in a liberal 
democracy, then it may be possible to give the kind of account Hauerwas 
demands: a compelling story about our lives together, in which we manifest, 
however imperfectly, some aspect of the reality of God’s kingdom—in this case, 
that we are all equals as participants in the story of our inclusion in God’s 
grace.18 
This is not a “lesser evils” argument, as Hauerwas sometimes caricatures 
Lutheran political ethics,19 but an ideal that seeks to instantiate a theological 
truth about the equality of all persons in the relationships we have with others, 
mediated through state institutions and practices. Humans are created in God’s 
image and therefore are entitled to be treated by others in a way that respects 
God’s creation. Rather than considering the law a lesser evil, I would go so far 
as to understand it as a positive good for humans insofar as it enables people to 
treat each other with respect and tell Christian lawyers that they may 
participate in helping the legal system realize its own characteristic ends.20 To 
have any hope of persuading Hauerwas, however, this argument cannot 
abstractly use terms like “equality” and “rule of law” that are not embedded in 
a context that includes history, tradition, and memory.21 Thus, I suggest briefly a 
story that offers a background rich enough to provide the kind of justification 
Hauerwas seeks. 
 
 18.  Cf. STANLEY HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM: A PRIMER IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS 27 
(1983) [hereinafter HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM]. Waldron has offered a political–
theological argument along these lines. See JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, AND EQUALITY: 
CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS OF JOHN LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT (2002); Jeremy Waldron, Persons, 
Community, and the Image of God in Rawls’ Brief Inquiry (N.Y.U. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working 
Papers, Paper No. 254, 2011), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/254. 
 19.  See, e.g., STANLEY HAUERWAS, A Christian Critique of Christian America, in THE 
HAUERWAS READER 459, 462 (John Berkman & Michael Cartweight eds., 2001) [hereinafter 
HAUERWAS, A Christian Critique]. I refer to this as a caricature because sophisticated Lutheran 
theologians are aware that “Christian ethics does not acknowledge this tragic compromise, that on the 
contrary the commands of the Sermon on the Mount are quite unconditional and make no allowance 
for the conditioning of all goals by the sphere of means. . . . Man cannot get off the hook of God’s 
unconditional requirement by pleading that the world in which he is set is an evil world.” 1 HELMUT 
THIELICKE, THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 486 (William H. Lazareth ed., Fortress Press 1969) (1958). 
 20.  Cf. WITTE, supra note 15, at 4 (“It was one thing to deconstruct the framework of medieval 
Catholic law, politics, and society with a sharp theological sword. It was quite another thing to 
reconstruct a new Lutheran framework of law, politics, and society with only this theological sword in 
hand. Luther learned this lesson the hard way in the crisis years of the 1520s, and it almost destroyed 
his movement. He quickly came to realize that law was not just a necessary evil but an essential blessing 
in this earthly life.”). 
 21.  STANLEY HAUERWAS, Remembering Martin Luther King Jr. Remembering, in WILDERNESS 
WANDERINGS: PROBING TWENTIETH-CENTURY THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 225, 229–32 (1997). 
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II 
HAUERWAS ON LIBERALISM 
A.   The Necessary Embodiment of Ethics in Narratives and Traditions (Which 
Presuppose a Community) 
In Hauerwas’s theology, a political community is constituted by shared 
traditions that identify and elaborate upon the virtues of its citizens, which 
contribute to the ongoing flourishing of the community. Principles of ethics for 
one’s own life and the life of one’s community are not derived from reason 
alone, but must be justified in terms of whether they are directed toward the 
completion of a journey upon which a particular community finds itself.22 “[T]he 
most basic task of any polity is to offer its people a sense of participation in an 
adventure.”23 There is no way to pry apart ethical principles from evaluations of 
character, or character from the description of a political community.24 All of 
these evaluations are embedded in a narrative that continues to unfold as the 
community encounters new challenges. 
The problem with liberal political theory as practiced by philosophers like 
John Rawls and Joseph Raz, is that it proceeds as though it were possible to 
abstract principles of ethics from particular communities with memory and 
history, and to judge from some hypothetical standpoint—an Archimedean 
point apart from all of these thick, ongoing, enacted traditions, with their 
characteristic ends and practices.25 Stated strongly, abstract rules and principles 
are unintelligible without a narrative and tradition to give them content; there is 
no deeper mode of understanding of which stories are merely illustrative.26 
Thus, liberalism is incoherent at the level of axiology. It seeks to begin with a 
foundation of universal, ahistorical values but fails because there is no such 
thing as values apart from communities, narratives, and traditions. Liberalism 
also fails to account for the way in which ethical principles are embodied in 
 
 22.  See, e.g., STANLEY HAUERWAS & WILLIAM H. WILLIMON, RESIDENT ALIENS: LIFE IN THE 
CHRISTIAN COLONY 61 (1989) (“To launch out on a journey is to move toward some goal. . . . Perhaps 
this explains why Jesus’ ethic was so thoroughly eschatological—an ethic bound up with his 
proclamation of the end of history. Ethics is a function of the telos, the end.”); STANLEY HAUERWAS, 
Christianity: It’s Not a Religion: It’s an Adventure, in THE HAUERWAS READER, supra note 19, at 522, 
523 [hereinafter HAUERWAS, Christianity: It’s Not a Religion; It’s an Adventure]. 
 23.  STANLEY HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER: TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE 
CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHIC 9, 13 (1981) [hereinafter HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER]. 
 24.  HAUERWAS & WILLIMON, supra note 22, at 79 (“[A]ll ethics, even non-Christian ethics, make 
sense only when embodied in sets of social practices that constitute a community.”). 
 25.  HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM, supra note 18, at 61–62; HAUERWAS, AFTER 
CHRISTENDOM?, supra note 14, at 93–101; cf. AVISHAI MARGALIT, THE ETHICS OF MEMORY (2002) 
(considering the role of memory and communities in ethics and politics). 
 26.  HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM, supra note 18, at 22–26; see also STANLEY 
HAUERWAS, WITH THE GRAIN OF THE UNIVERSE: THE CHURCH’S WITNESS AND NATURAL 
THEOLOGY 206 (2001) [hereinafter HAUERWAS, WITH THE GRAIN OF THE UNIVERSE] (“Modern 
philosophers and theologians generally do not think stories can do the work of argument. Yet I agree 
with John Milbank that ‘narrating,’ exactly because narration is the ‘science’ of the particular, is a more 
basic category than either explanation or understanding.”). 
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practices (in MacIntyre’s sense).27 Ethics is a matter of doing, not just detached 
reflection, and doing well at any practice necessarily requires a kind of 
apprenticeship to someone who has already demonstrated excellence in the 
craft.28 
A weaker version of this claim is that, to the extent liberalism offers a 
constitutive narrative with archetypal characters and virtues, it makes for a 
pretty lousy adventure story. The story offered by political liberalism, as 
envisioned by Hauerwas, proceeds as follows: A bunch of people without a 
shared history get together and form a community in which it is assumed that 
people will act out of self-interest, except to the extent they are restrained by 
laws enacted pursuant to a constitutional scheme to which the founders of their 
community have given their consent.29 Other than the history of assenting to this 
purportedly neutral framework of institutions and rules, our community’s only 
real story is that each individual is free to make up his or her own story.30 The 
failure in this case may be quasi-aesthetic, not conceptual. Under the standards 
according to which stories should be judged, the constitutive narrative offered 
by political liberalism is dull, uninspiring, colorless, and shallow. 
Political liberals are trying to tell an interesting story around the centrality 
of autonomy, not realizing that self-created values are either not values at all,31 
or at least are such thin values that they fail to inspire loyalty and commitment.32 
The ironic result is that individuals—who need communities to form their 
character and identity—lack the resources to construct their own narrative, so 
they use transient pleasures to anesthetize themselves from the anxiety that 
would result if they grasped the meaninglessness of their lives.33 Not 
surprisingly, if politics and public life are structured around the so-called goods 
of bread and circuses, the result will be a community that has nothing to offer 
people who are trying to lead lives aimed at some meaningful end. Moreover, 
 
 27.  See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984). 
 28.  Hauerwas frequently cites his childhood experience learning the craft of bricklaying as an 
analogy with how excellence in general is transmitted and learned, and how crafts and traditions are 
preserved. See, e.g., STANLEY HAUERWAS, HANNAH’S CHILD: A THEOLOGIAN’S MEMOIR 36–37 
(2010) [hereinafter HAUERWAS, HANNAH’S CHILD]; HAUERWAS, AFTER CHRISTENDOM?, supra note 
14, at 101–07. 
 29.  See HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER, supra note 23, at 72, 78. 
 30.  Id. at 84; HAUERWAS & WILLIMON, supra note 22, at 79 (“The goal of this [modern, liberal, 
Enlightenment] ethic is to detach the individual from his or her tradition, parents, stories, community, 
and history, and thereby allow him or her to stand alone, to decide, to choose, and to act alone.”). 
 31.  HAUERWAS, Christianity: It’s Not a Religion: It’s an Adventure, supra note 22, at 524. In 
secular legal ethics, David Luban identified as a fundamental weakness in the liberal justification of the 
standard conception the assumption that autonomy was itself a value, as opposed to being merely a 
pass-through for the underlying values that explained the choices autonomously made by individuals. 
See David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Reply to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. BAR FOUND. 
RES. J. 637 (1986). 
 32.  See CHURCH, supra note 11 (expressing the concern that if legal ethics is supposed to be 
universal and applicable to all lawyers, “regardless of the particularity of the traditions, practices, and 
places that shape them,” then the profession winds up with “shared moral content [that is] razor thin”). 
 33.  HAUERWAS & WILLIMON, supra note 22, at 63. 
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citizens in this sort of society will no longer cultivate the virtues necessary to 
sustain the community.34 Fortunately, notes Hauerwas, there is an alternative in 
the radical otherness of the church. 
B.   The Strangeness of the Christian Community 
In contrast with the dreary story offered by liberalism, Christianity promises 
a real adventure. To go along on this adventure, however, requires 
subordinating one’s autonomy to the authority of a tradition. Being a faithful 
Christian means that one’s story is not self-created, but given. “The Gospels 
make wonderfully clear that the disciples had not the foggiest idea of what they 
had gotten into when they followed Jesus.”35 Being a faithful Christian means 
belonging to a community that is distinct from the world.36 From this 
observation springs the objection to the Constantinian accommodation of 
church and state. By making its claims to truth in language that is either 
comprehensible or at least non-threatening to those in power, the church tends 
to dilute the power, clarity, and distinctiveness of its message. In a nice turn of 
phrase Hauerwas observes that “in the name of being politically responsible, 
the church became politically invisible.”37 The church is necessarily a strange 
thing, because it is structured not by the autonomous actions of individuals who 
are empowered to create their own history, tradition, and meaning, but around 
an eschatological conception of history, as having already been made to come 
out right in the kingdom of God.38 It is not hard to see why a social ethic aimed 
at witnessing to God’s redemption of humanity would seem peculiar indeed to 
others who believe that they have in themselves the capacity to make the world 
a better place. 
There is a very important implication for political ethics in Hauerwas’s 
insistence on the centrality of narrative and tradition, which can be stated in 
weak and strong forms. The weak version is that adherents to particular 
traditions, or members of communities, should not feel obligated to attempt to 
explain their peculiar practices to outsiders. One of Hauerwas’s objections to 
Reinhold Niebuhr is that he was so eager to render Christian ethics acceptable 
to the wider society, in general liberal-political terms, that he was inclined to 
remove all of the distinctive, peculiar, powerful bits from the Christian 
message.39 The Christian community has a distinctive ethical stance that may not 
 
 34.  HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM, supra note 18, at 102–03; cf. MACINTYRE, supra 
note 27, at 186–87 (identifying characteristically modern conceptions of individual lives—the manager, 
the therapist, and the aesthete—and implying that these people lead meaningless lives). 
 35.  HAUERWAS & WILLIMON, supra note 22, at 49. 
 36.  HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM, supra note 18, at 60. 
 37.  HAUERWAS, HANNAH’S CHILD, supra note 28, at 160; see also HAUERWAS & WILLIMON, 
supra note 22, at 27 (noting that the accommodation of the church to the state enables “Christians to 
share power without being a problem for the powerful”). 
 38.  HAUERWAS & WILLIMON, supra note 22, at 86–92. 
 39.  STANLEY HAUERWAS, On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological, in THE HAUERWAS 
READER, supra note 19, at 51, 60–61; HAUERWAS & WILLIMON, supra note 22, at 32 (“[B]oth the 
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be acceptable to the wider culture, but it would be a mistake to water down 
Christian stories just so they do not seem so strange and jarring, because it is 
precisely the strangeness of the stories told by God’s faithful people that makes 
them exciting and compelling. The strong version of this position is that there is 
no point in trying to explain, because practices and their associated values are 
unintelligible to those outside the tradition: 
Big words like “peace” and “justice,” slogans the church adopts under the 
presumption that, even if people do not know what “Jesus Christ is Lord” means, they 
will know what peace and justice means, are words awaiting content. The church really 
does not know what these words mean apart from the life and death of Jesus of 
Nazareth.
40
 
Ethical principles gain content from the way they are employed in the 
stories told about virtuous individuals who are members of communities 
constituted by fidelity to their traditions. On their own, principles are literally 
meaningless.41 
It can sometimes be unclear in Hauerwas’s work whether he intends the 
strong or the weak version of the “narrativity” thesis.42 However, a pervasive 
theme in his work is the emphasis on the Christian community as bearing 
witness to an eschatological possibility—a vision of the direction in which God 
is moving the world.43 One of his principal objections to the ethics of Niebuhr is 
that it effaces the eschatological dimension of ethics, stigmatizing it as 
“unrealistic” or “pie-in-the-sky,” when in fact the whole point of Christian 
 
conservative and the liberal church . . . are basically accommodationist (that is, Constantinian) in their 
social ethic. Both assume wrongly that the American church’s primary social task is to underwrite 
American democracy.”). Hauerwas seems to count it as a fault of Reinhold Niebuhr’s position that it 
influenced Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. See HAUERWAS, A 
COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER, supra note 23, at 60 n.24. 
 40.  HAUERWAS & WILLIMON, supra note 22, at 38; see also HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE 
KINGDOM, supra note 18, at 58 (denying that truthfulness, uprightness, and faithfulness are abstract 
values to which Christians should subscribe, with Christian conviction simply supplying the motivation 
to act on them). 
 41.  HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM, supra note 18, at 26 (“Narrative is not secondary 
for our knowledge of God; there is no ‘point’ that can be separated from the story. . . . [N]arratives are 
necessary to our understanding of those aspects of our existence which admit of no further 
explanation—i.e. God, the world, and the self.”). 
 42.  Consider this passage, which contains both weak and strong versions of the thesis: 
Notions like “abortion” are not simply given; their meaning and intelligibility depend on a 
narrative construal. [Strong version.] Indeed part of the problem with the “old morality,” 
particularly in Catholic moral theology, was a concentration on “act descriptions” as 
representing an “objective and thus universal morality.” Those “descriptions,” however, were 
abstracted from the communal narratives and practices which made them compelling. [Weak 
version.] 
Id. at 117. 
 43.  See, e.g., HAUERWAS & WILLIMON, supra note 22, at 86. Hauerwas has said he resists the label 
of “narrative theologian” because he sees in it the urge to reduce the content of a story to something 
else—generally some kind of value or ideal that is not alien to liberalism. See STANLEY HAUERWAS, 
PERFORMING THE FAITH: BONHOEFFER AND THE PRACTICE OF NONVIOLENCE 135, 136–37 (2004) 
[hereinafter HAUERWAS, PERFORMING THE FAITH]. 
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ethics should be to point toward a final end for the world.44 The idea of witness 
shows that Hauerwas must intend the weak version of the narrativity thesis. 
That is, it must be possible for the story as preserved and told within the 
Christian colony to appeal more broadly. The church’s social ethic—which 
Hauerwas has famously stated that the church is, rather than it has,45—
demonstrates that love, forgiveness, hospitality, and peace are possible in this 
world. This is a story that is intelligible to others, even if it depends essentially 
on God’s action.46 
C.   The Refusal of the Church to Compromise its Witness to Curry Favor with 
Caesar 
The first task of Christians is not to make society work,47 or to make the 
world more peaceable or just.48 “[O]ur greatest tragedies occurred because the 
church was all too willing to serve the world.”49 In its modern, mainstream guise, 
Hauerwas has used the label Constantinianism to refer to the view that 
Christians should, on the basis of theological principles, enthusiastically support 
democracy and use the apparatus of politics and the state to seek to make 
society more just.50 Hauerwas makes a number of different arguments against 
Constantinianism. One is that it causes the church to water down its message in 
order to appeal to the wider society: the accommodation of the church to the 
state “leads Christians to judge their ethical positions, not on the basis of what 
is faithful to our particular tradition, but rather on the basis of how much 
Christian ethics Caesar can be induced to swallow without choking.”51 
Recurring examples in history of institutional churches cozying up to tyrants 
shows that it is extremely difficult for the church to withstand the temptation 
offered by power, acceptance, and social prestige.52 Another argument is that 
 
 44.  HAUERWAS & WILLIMON, supra note 22, at 87. 
 45.  Id. at 99. 
 46.  See id. at 92 (“The Sermon, like the rest of scripture, is addressed neither to isolated 
individuals nor to the wider world. Rather, here are words for the colony, a prefiguration of the kinds 
of community in which the reign of God will shine in all its glory. So there is nothing private in the 
demands of the Sermon. It is very public, very political, very social in that it depicts the public form by 
which the colony shall witness to the world that God really is busy redeeming humanity, reconciling the 
world to himself in Christ.”). 
 47.  HAUERWAS, Christianity: It’s Not a Religion: It’s an Adventure, supra note 22, at 527. 
 48.  HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM, supra note 18, at 99; see also HAUERWAS, WITH 
THE GRAIN OF THE UNIVERSE, supra note 26, at 208 n.4 (“The great failure of Christians in modernity 
is our willingness to make peace with the world.”). 
 49.  HAUERWAS & WILLIMON, supra note 22, at 43. 
 50.  HAUERWAS, A Christian Critique, supra note 19, at 462–63, 467–70. 
 51.  HAUERWAS & WILLIMON, supra note 22, at 72; see also HAUERWAS, HANNAH’S CHILD, 
supra note 28, at 174 (noting the “Niebuhrian presumption that pacifists were OK as long as they 
stayed out of the way of the people who had to run the world”); HAUERWAS, AFTER CHRISTENDOM?, 
supra note 14, at 59 (criticizing John Langan for worrying about “the risk of being relegated to the 
fringes of society and losing influence on the forming of social policy”). 
 52.  The Lutheran church in Germany obviously has a lot to answer for in this regard. The 
notorious Ansbach Ratschlag concludes, “[W]e as believing Christians thank the Lord God that in its 
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once Christianity became politically mainstream and became detached from an 
eschatological narrative, it was possible, at least in principle, for all citizens to 
abide by the church’s ethical principles and to evaluate actions in terms of their 
outcomes. With that development ethics tended to become pragmatic in nature: 
“Once the course of history is thought to be empirically discernable and the 
prosperity of our regime the measure of the good, efficacy becomes a decisive 
test for the moral rightness of our action.”53 Finally, in Hauerwas’s theology, sin 
is living in rebellion against the nature of reality, which is to say living as though 
we are the authors of our own stories instead of participants in the unfolding of 
God’s narrative.54 While participating in government, we may tend to lose sight 
of the fact that we are not directing the course of history but are along for the 
ride, so to speak, with God making the outcome-determinative decisions. 
In this last argument against Constantinianism, the theological concept of 
sin is connected with the political theory of liberalism. Liberalism encourages us 
to conceive of ourselves as empowered to self-creation, as masters of our fate 
and captains of our souls.55 We are led to violence when we become so 
preoccupied with our self-protection that we forget that we are not the center of 
history.56 Rather, the Christian colony should order itself so that it serves as a 
“witness to the world that God really is busy redeeming humanity.”57 But 
everyone has to be clear on what the colony is doing: it is not the case that God 
is governing the world through the apparatus of the state.58 “The church must 
 
hour of need he has given our people the Führer as a ‘good and faithful sovereign,’ and that in the 
National Socialist state He is endeavoring to provide us with disciplined and honorable ‘good 
government.’” THIELICKE, supra note 19, at 366. This colossal historical failing can be seen as a 
reductio ad absurdum of Constantinianism. It is likely that no amount of labor by theologians like 
Helmut Thielicke to recover an authentic tradition that was perverted by the institutional church in 
Germany will convince critics like Hauerwas that it is possible for a church to be mainstream and also 
to resist the unjust use of power. 
 53.  HAUERWAS, A Christian Critique, supra note 19, at 476. 
 54.  HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM, supra note 18, at 31; see also JOHN HOWARD 
YODER, THE POLITICS OF JESUS 142 (1972) (identifying the fallenness of “the Powers” as the refusal to 
“accept the modesty that would have permitted them to remain conformed to the creative purpose” 
and instead “claim[ing] for themselves an absolute value”). 
 55.  Hauerwas criticizes the movie Dead Poets’ Society for the message that students should learn 
to think for themselves. “A central pedagogical task,” instead, he argues, “is to tell students that they 
do not yet have minds worth making up.” HAUERWAS, AFTER CHRISTENDOM?, supra note 14, at 98. 
 56.  HAUERWAS & WILLIMON, supra note 22, at 89. 
 57.  Id. at 92; see also CHURCH, supra note 11, at 110 (“Yoder argues that the church lives out this 
witness by living now in the manner of that coming eschatological kingdom itself.”). Hauerwas reports 
that he has grown weary of denying that he is calling for Christians to separate themselves from the 
world. See STANLEY HAUERWAS, CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE TODAY 1 (Brazos Press 2001) (1988); 
HAUERWAS, HANNAH’S CHILD, supra note 28, at 208–09. Hauerwas says in many places that he is not 
demanding withdrawal from the world. See, e.g., HAUERWAS, PERFORMING THE FAITH, supra note 43, 
at 26 (“[T]he church’s practice of nonviolence does not require the church to withdraw from the world 
but rather provides the conditions necessary for the church’s service to the world.”); HAUERWAS, 
WITH THE GRAIN OF THE UNIVERSE, supra note 26, at 220; HAUERWAS & WILLIMON, supra note 22, 
at 41–42, 87; HAUERWAS, A Christian Critique, supra note 19, at 477. In this he follows Yoder. See 
YODER, supra note 54, at 148. 
 58.  HAUERWAS, PERFORMING THE FAITH, supra note 43, at 169, 173. 
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learn time and time again that its task is not to make the world the kingdom, but 
to be faithful to the kingdom by showing to the world what it means to be a 
community of peace.”59 If the church cannot work through the medium of the 
state, it would appear to follow that being a Christian lawyer is an extremely 
fraught undertaking, because lawyers are involved in the implementation of the 
state’s laws.60 
Hauerwas will not let liberals get away with platitudes about the social 
contract and government by the people, of the people, and for people, without 
acknowledging the coercion that is necessarily implicated in governing. He 
writes, 
I continue to share John Howard Yoder’s concern that governments that claim to rule 
in the name of “the people” are adept at hiding not only from “the people” but 
themselves the violence inherent in the order they have learned to call “peace.”
61
 
When Christian liberals claim to be working toward the common good of 
society, or a more just social order, they fail to perceive that their employment 
of the mechanisms of state authority is inherently violent. This point was made 
powerfully by the legal scholar Robert Cover, who argued that all acts of legal 
interpretation are the imposition of violence upon another.62 Legal 
interpretation, for Cover, is differentiated from literary or philosophical 
interpretation by the necessary involvement of pain and death.63 This way of 
talking sounds overblown, but Cover’s point is that a legal interpretation 
necessarily results in something that either will be, or may be done. The 
practicality of the law means that something will occur in the world that is 
inconsistent with someone else’s conception of what should be done. Most of 
the time, however, the inherent violence of the law is masked by implicit 
structures of domination, which cause those who are affected to simply 
acquiesce.64 Christian lawyers, then, may inadvertently become parties to the 
violence inherent in the law. 
III 
THE SWORD AND THE LEGISLATURE: DIVERGENT VISIONS OF LIBERALISM 
AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 
A.   A Story 
This is a symposium on Hauerwas and the law, so one must contribute to it 
with a commitment to keeping as much as possible of Hauerwas’s distinctive 
 
 59.  HAUERWAS, THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM, supra note 18, at 103. 
 60.  See Milner S. Ball, A Meditation on Vocation, in RADICAL CHRISTIAN AND EXEMPLARY 
LAWYER 130 (Andrew W. McThenia, Jr. ed., 1995) (“[A] person cannot be a lawyer without being 
involved in [the law’s] fallenness.”). 
 61.  HAUERWAS, PERFORMING THE FAITH, supra note 43, 19. 
 62.  See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). 
 63.  Id. at 1606–07, 1609–10. 
 64.  Id. at 1616–17 
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theological methodology and substantive commitments. Although I will argue 
for a modest Constantinian conception of legal ethics, I hope to do so in the 
way Hauerwas argues all theological ethics must: by telling a story about the 
relationship between people—in this case, lawyers—and their communities. 
The story illustrates the claim the legal system makes upon the respect of 
citizens, even Christian citizens who owe their primary allegiance to God. The 
ethical obligations of lawyers can be understood in terms of the obligations 
citizens have to respect the law which, in turn, are given by the value of 
equality, and the accompanying duty to treat one another with respect. My 
hope is that the story fleshes out an ethical case for liberalism that I have made 
elsewhere in more abstract terms.65 
The story is set in my adopted home of upstate New York, a region that has 
experienced a seemingly inexorable economic decline in recent decades. 
Upstate cities such as Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, and Albany grew in the 
mid-Nineteenth Century as the opening of the Erie Canal dramatically lessened 
freight rates between the east coast and the western United States. 
Manufacturing and industry developed rapidly in areas with access to navigable 
waterways. With the decline of heavy industry beginning in the 1970s, however, 
these cities steadily lost jobs and population. Other important employers in the 
region, such as Eastman Kodak (in Rochester) and IBM (in Elmira), found 
themselves unable to adapt to a rapidly changing technological landscape and 
eliminated thousands of jobs. Given this bleak picture, the discovery of vast 
natural gas deposits in a formation known as the Marcellus Shale was big news 
in the region. Much of this formation lies in central and western Pennsylvania 
and central New York. Estimates of the size of the gas deposits in the formation 
vary, but it appears that there might be enough gas in the Marcellus formation 
to satisfy between two and fourteen years of total natural gas consumption 
needs in the United States. Marcellus gas is particularly attractive in light of low 
transportation costs to the East Coast. If development of this resource were 
permitted in New York, exploration, drilling, and extraction of gas would 
directly create thousands of jobs, and the indirect effects on equipment 
suppliers, construction companies, hotels, restaurants, bars, and so on, would be 
immense. 
Extracting gas at a cost that makes the wells commercially viable requires a 
technique called hydraulic fracturing (often referred to as “hydrofracking” or 
“fracking”), in which water is injected horizontally, at high pressures, into the 
shale formation to fracture the rock. The potential environmental harms 
associated with fracking are significant. The process requires enormous 
quantities of water, which become contaminated with chemicals used in the 
drilling process and with naturally occurring underground radiation. Toxic 
chemicals may seep into groundwater used for drinking and agricultural uses.66 
 
 65.  See WENDEL, supra note 4. 
 66.  Agriculture, including dairy farming and an emerging wine industry in the Finger Lakes 
region, is an important part of the local economy. 
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Fracking operations already underway in Pennsylvania have led to methane 
pollution of water supplies in the town of Dimrock, memorably demonstrated 
in the film Gasland by homeowners setting their tap water on fire.67 In addition, 
trucks and heavy equipment used in the drilling process cause damage to 
existing infrastructure, such as roads and bridges. There has been extensive 
reporting and public discussion about whether to allow hydrofracking in New 
York. Public opinion appears to be about evenly split,68 and the debate 
continues about the best way to balance the need for economic development in 
a region that could sorely use jobs with the importance of protecting the 
environment and the health of citizens. The state’s Department of 
Environmental Conservation considered the available scientific evidence and 
released an environmental impact statement and proposed regulations 
governing drilling.69 No matter what action the state governor takes, lawsuits 
may be filed by citizens who disagree with his conclusion. In other words, in 
New York we are living through a typically noisy, contentious example of the 
democratic process in action. 
B.   The Circumstances of Politics 
With respect to the question of whether to allow hydrofracking, people in 
upstate New York are in what Jeremy Waldron has called the circumstances of 
politics.70 The circumstances of politics arise when people live alongside one 
another in a community, perceive the need to act together to deal with some 
problem, and also perceive that, despite disagreeing about what the solution 
ought to be, it may be possible to employ procedures that enable competing 
viewpoints to be heard, and that the participants in the debate are to be treated 
with as much equality and respect as is compatible with the need to eventually 
reach a moderately stable resolution of the controversy. Imagine numerous 
interested citizens: an owner of a sizeable parcel of unproductive farmland who 
could earn significant royalties from leasing mineral rights to a gas company, a 
high-school-educated resident of a small town who might formerly have been 
employed in a manufacturing job but now faces a best-case employment 
scenario of working at Wal-Mart, an organic farmer whose produce fetches 
premium prices because she is able to guarantee that it is free of chemical 
contamination, the owner of a construction business who has been struggling to 
 
 67.  GASLAND (HBO Documentary Films 2010). 
 68.  See Celeste Katz, Hydrofracking Poll: New York Splits, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 18, 2011, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2011/05/hydrofracking-poll-new-york-splits (reporting 
that 41% of New York State residents oppose hydrofracking while 38% support it, with 21% unsure. In 
the upstate region, 47% are against hydrofracking while 37% support it). 
 69.  NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, FINAL GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT (GEIS) ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM 
(1992); NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, REVISED DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE OIL, GAS AND SOLUTION MINING REGULATORY 
PROGRAM 9–2 (2011). 
 70.  See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT passim (1999). 
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make ends meet as residents leave the upstate region, the operator of a bed and 
breakfast whose guests are attracted to the scenic beauty of the Finger Lakes, 
and anyone who owns shares in an energy company with a significant “play” in 
the Marcellus Shale. 
How should these citizens deal with one another? Each of the characters in 
our story should see that he or she is a member of a political community, not an 
isolated Robinson Crusoe. This means that any justification given for an action 
is necessarily in the first-person plural. For example, the landowner might 
prefer that government authorities authorize fracking quickly and with few 
restrictions, so that he can start making money off his gas leases. But when he 
appeals to the idea that the government ought to authorize fracking, this implies 
that it would be the right thing to do from the standpoint of the community as a 
whole. Although the term “community” gets thrown around a great deal in 
political philosophy, if used properly it refers to something more than just an 
aggregation of persons. It signifies something about the relationship among 
people: a commitment to treat one another as fellow citizens, as rights-bearers, 
as people entitled to be treated with respect and not simply dominated or 
coerced.71 The idea of a community contains an irreducible aspect of “us-ness” 
that requires everyone to think and act in terms of everyone else’s interests. A 
community is not just “an expedient for individuals,”72 but a nexus of 
relationships. This does not mean people must act out of radical altruism. 
Rather, it means that seeing oneself as a citizen requires finding a way to 
recognize, consider, sum up, and resolve the competing views of everyone in the 
community about what ought to be done, as opposed to merely trying to get 
one’s way by any available means. Accordingly, citizens acknowledge one 
another as entitled to respectful treatment, not domination, coercion, or 
manipulation. 
The public institutions in our society, including the media, legislatures, 
administrative agencies, and courts, provide a means by which citizens can 
propose solutions to a problem that can stand in the name of the community as 
a whole. Citizens can debate, protest, write letters to the editor, organize, tweet, 
make films (like Gasland), lobby, vote, and file lawsuits. Indeed, all of these 
media are being used in upstate New York as members of its political 
community attempt to discern the best way—considered from a collective 
viewpoint—to proceed in light of the potential benefits of a natural resource 
and the environmental and health risks it poses. The fracking example shows 
that the law is implicated in virtually everything we do in a complex society. 
There would be no way to develop a natural resource without a scheme of 
property rights: a construction project requires enforceable contracts and 
regulations governing labor practices; interferences by neighbors with one 
 
 71.  See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 201 (1986) (distinguishing between a “bare” 
community and a “true” community); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xxxix–xl (paperback ed. 
1996) (1993) (arguing that a political community is not a mere modus vivendi). 
 72.  WALDRON, supra note 70, at 4. 
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another’s peace and quiet are governed by common law nuisance doctrines; 
environmental regulations govern the disposal of wastewater; selling gas 
requires a system of futures contracts and rules governing the operation of 
commodities exchanges; a system of taxation is required to maintain roads and 
bridges. For any other activity, a similar list could be generated of the ways in 
which the activity is pervasively law-governed. 
What I want to suggest, borrowing from a wonderful book title by Stanley 
Fish,73 is that our society is comprehensively law-governed “and it’s a good 
thing, too.” It’s a good thing because the law provides a means to balance and 
resolve competing considerations, such as the need for economic development 
and the protection of the environment, in a way that allows citizens to treat one 
another with respect. Mechanisms like lobbying, organizing, and even litigation 
allow the voices of individuals to be heard. Indeed, the state must take the 
voices of citizens into account, which is why administrative agencies must 
publicize proposed regulations and consider public comment before they are 
effective. Notice the significance of the metaphor of hearing the voices of 
citizens. It suggests that the government must respond to reasons, and must 
articulate reasons to explain and justify its actions. In doing so, it expresses 
respect for citizens as moral agents, not merely as subjects.74 Hauerwas worries 
about a thin conception of politics in which self-interested individuals use public 
institutions as instruments in a struggle to maximize their own advantage but 
end up with nothing of authentic value. A different conception of liberalism and 
democracy, however, might emphasize the way in which public debate, 
lobbying, voting, notice-and-comment rulemaking, and so on tends to reinforce 
a vision of citizens as bearers of rights. “[T]he right-bearer is one who is self-
aware and vigorously conscious of both the extent of and the limits on what he 
is entitled to demand from others.”75 In other words, we are all one another’s 
equals, and the law gives us a means to express respect for this equality in the 
way we act together in communities. 
Traditional theological analyses of the role of the state talk about 
government officials ruling with the sword,76 emphasizing the coercive and even 
violent aspects of the law. The law is much more than the sword, however. The 
little story about fracking suggests that the law can be a way that people use to 
talk to each other. The idea of a right—to drill, to have roads repaired, to enjoy 
clean air and water, to receive a fair wage for work, et cetera—is one that 
depends on the idea of the rule of law. The rule of law is a concept with a great 
deal of baggage, but all that is meant here is that there is a difference between 
raw power and rightful power.77 The rule of law enables the (relatively) 
 
 73.  STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH: AND IT’S A GOOD THING, TOO 
(1994). 
 74.  WALDRON, supra note 70, at 221–23. 
 75.  Id. at 223. 
 76.  See, e.g., DAVID C. STEINMETZ, LUTHER IN CONTEXT 122 (2d ed. 2002). 
 77.  Cf. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 258–69 (1975). 
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powerless to say to the (relatively) powerful, “Hey, you can’t do that to me!” Of 
course, it may also enable someone to respond, “Oh yes I can—here is the right 
by which I exercise my power.” But the important aspect of the rule of law is 
that it creates at least the possibility of a justification that is independent of 
interests and power, and rests instead on a process of enactment that treats 
citizens with the respect due a community of equals. Hauerwas worries that the 
language of rights is alienating, and that it is premised on a thin conception of 
individual autonomy as the foundation of ethics. There is a different way of 
looking at rights, however, which emphasizes equality and mutual respect as the 
foundation of the rule of law. The story of a political community facing 
intractable disagreement is intended to illustrate how the law can serve as a 
framework for peaceful coexistence in a world in which other, thicker traditions 
have broken down.78 
C.   Christian Attitudes Toward Public Institutions 
Yoder argues that it is essential to see public institutions as fallen, but not 
limitlessly evil.79 The fallenness of any human creation is related to Hauerwas’s 
definition of sin considered previously—that is, the confusion of who is morally 
sovereign in the world. Christians must be faithful, and that means 
understanding that they play a role in God’s story, and that autonomous self-
creation is an insufficient foundation for a virtuous life. Thus, one must be 
extremely careful not to regard public institutions as idols that demand 
unconditional loyalty, and not to acquiesce in the self-glorification of the state.80 
However, one also must be careful not to regard the government and other 
public institutions as something with which God is not concerned. As Yoder 
notes, 
[T]he theology of the orders of creation has generally affirmed that Jesus Christ has 
little directly to do with them, but that rather these several orders (the state, family, 
economy, etc.) have an autonomous value unrelated to redemption and the church, by 
virtue of their being the product of a divine act of creation.
81
 
Here Yoder cites H. Richard Niebuhr, but the allusion to the traditional 
theology of the orders of creation suggests that the target of his criticism is 
 
 78.  Sarah Cravens has suggested to me that a theologian in the Barthian tradition might object 
that I have posited a human problem and solved it in human terms, only dressed up with lots of 
language about God. That is different from addressing a problem that arises when a problem is 
considered from the point of view of what we know about our relationship with God. I have not found 
a place where Hauerwas says something like this explicitly, but it seems to be a fair reading of his 
position that political problems must be considered, first and foremost, from the point of view of God’s 
moral sovereignty in the world. As a complete amateur theologian I cannot give an adequate response 
to this objection, which seems quite powerful to me. An adequate response would have to begin with 
considerations of the right way we as fallen humans are capable of apprehending God’s will regarding 
the way we live in communities with other fallen humans. 
 79.  YODER, supra note 54, at 141–42. 
 80.  Id. at 143, 145. 
 81.  Id. at 144. 
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traditional Lutheran doctrine.82 But the key Lutheran point is slightly different 
from what Yoder is saying here. The central teaching is not that the family, 
state, and economy have autonomous value, but that nothing in the fallen world 
can be salvific. No system of laws can be essential for salvation, because 
justification is solely by faith. No one can be saved by obedience to the law. In 
contrast with the church, which is ruled exclusively by God through the gospel, 
the world is governed by the state through the law. The state is still part of 
God’s government, but in the world, unlike the church, “the state rules through 
law, reason, human wisdom, and coercion.”83 The state is “an independent 
sphere of God’s governance,” but it is still a sphere of God’s governance.84 
Yoder is correct that the value of state institutions is unrelated to redemption, 
but not that it is autonomous in the sense that Hauerwas objects to. The state 
always remains accountable to God, not autonomous as a source of self-created 
value.85 
Indeed, Lutheran teaching is no less resistant than Hauerwas to the idea 
that humans are genuinely autonomous and morally sovereign, because of its 
emphasis on human nature as simultaneously redeemed and sinful.86 This 
doctrine is sometimes understood as positing a public–private dichotomy,87 but 
it is really a thoroughgoing ontological claim about the paradoxical nature of 
humans who are freed by grace but remain in bondage to sin.88 What follows 
from this for political ethics is an attitude of humility, recognizing that 
“precisely when Christians mount their most valiant public efforts for God, they 
run the greatest risk of substituting their righteousness for the righteousness of 
Christ, and thereby subverting justification by faith.”89 Working within fallen 
human institutions is not only intrinsically corrupting, because everything 
created—everything human—is intrinsically sinful, but also intrinsically freed 
by God’s grace. Human laws can never fully instantiate God’s law, and human 
 
 82.  See, e.g., WITTE, supra note 15, at 87–117; STEINMETZ, supra note 76, at 112–25; James M. 
Childs, Jr., Ethics and the Promise of God, in THE PROMISE OF LUTHERAN ETHICS 97 (Karen L. 
Bloomquist & John R. Stumme eds., 1998). As discussed in this section, all of these authors argue for a 
position that is more subtle than the view criticized by Yoder. 
 83.  STEINMETZ, supra note 76, at 122; see also THIELICKE, supra note 19, at 371 (“Luther speaks 
of two ‘governments’ rather than two ‘kingdoms’ in order to show that we are not dealing with two 
spheres but with two modes of the divine rule.”). 
 84.  WILLIAM H. LAZARETH, CHRISTIANS IN SOCIETY: LUTHER, THE BIBLE, AND SOCIAL 
ETHICS 14 (2001) (“Luther’s final intention was to demonstrate God’s twofold rule of the whole world 
by law and gospel and not to separate it into two divorced realms of the sacred and the secular.”); 
WITTE, supra note 15, at 93 (“All three of these orders, governments, or estates, Luther insisted, 
represented different dimensions of God’s authority and law in the earthly kingdom. . . . All three not 
only exercised the justice and wrath of God against sin, but also anticipated the more perfect life and 
law of the heavenly kingdom.”). 
 85.  LAZARETH, supra note 84, at 71. 
 86.  WITTE, supra note 15, at 94–95. 
 87.  See CHURCH, supra note 11, at 85; THIELICKE, supra note 19, at 362–65 (recounting history of 
this interpretation). 
 88.  WITTE, supra note 15, at 96. 
 89.  Noll, supra note 16, at 38. 
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law is helpless to transform sinners into people who are righteous. As subjects 
of God’s law, Christians are in an ongoing state of becoming or transformation, 
with the telos of this law being God’s command of love: “Love is the fulfilling of 
the law.”90 Because anything human is never fully transformed and always bears 
the imprint of sin and rebellion against God’s will,91 any citizen or public official 
should be reluctant to trust in the goodness of any human artifact, including 
laws and the legal system. 
The fact that the legal system is suffused with liberal concepts like rights and 
autonomy should not be a reason for Christian lawyers to shun most ordinary 
lawyering tasks. Rather, a liberal conception of legality may be a recognition 
that we govern ourselves in the first-person plural, articulating reasons for 
action that purport to be general and stand in the name of society as a whole. 
The law offers a means of democratic self-government that is, at least in 
reasonably just societies, responsive to the need to settle contested issues in a 
way that is respectful of the entitlement of all citizens to be treated with respect, 
as equals. That strikes me as a significant achievement, and one in which a 
Christian lawyer, attentive to the imperfections of all human creations, can 
participate. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Many of the participants in this conference pressed Hauerwas to say 
something good about the law, the legal system, and lawyers. Surprisingly, he 
was quite willing to do so. Even such a thoroughgoing critic of liberalism as 
Hauerwas recognizes that there is some value in maintaining a practice of 
constraining the exercise of power by permitting the powerless to assert rights 
based in the positive law of a political community. If there is some good in the 
law, then there is nothing inherently problematic about the idea of a Christian 
lawyer, provided that the lawyer does not confuse the law with the ultimate 
source of moral authority. Importantly, however, a lawyer should also not 
confuse her own beliefs about what justice requires with what justice in fact 
requires. Christian lawyers should recognize that they are simultaneously 
redeemed and sinful. Human institutions such as the legal system possess a 
similar dual nature. Lawyers should therefore be reluctant to assume that the 
law overlaps with justice, as measured by the standard Hauerwas insists upon, 
namely God’s justice. Hauerwas might suggest that a Christian lawyer must 
understand herself as playing a role in God’s story—not being the author of her 
own story, with its own set of values grounded in the autonomy to write one’s 
own narrative from the ground up, free from the constraint of tradition and 
 
 90.  LAZARETH, supra note 82, at 75–78. 
 91.  THIELICKE, supra note 19, at 366 (emphasizing that there is always at work in history “another 
factor which is not the providential will of God, namely, man with his sin and rebellion against god’s 
will, and that this sin and rebellion are expressed structurally in the historical nexus and institutionally 
in specific perversions of family, nation, etc.”). 
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history. One can criticize the implicit idolatry of liberalism while nevertheless 
preserving a space within a liberal political order for faithful service by 
Christian citizens and lawyers. Thus, although Hauerwas has not had much to 
say directly about lawyers and legal ethics, it may be possible for lawyers to 
respond to the radicalism of God’s calling while also remaining faithful to their 
own professional craft. 
 
